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ABSTRACT 
To what extent should public utilities regulation be expected to converge across countries? When it 
occurs, will regulatory convergence lead to positive outcomes for utility sectors? This paper attempts to 
provide new answers to these questions. Building on the core proposition of the New Institutional 
Economics (NIE) that similar regulations generate different outcomes depending on their fit with the 
underlying domestic institutions, we develop a simple theoretical model and explore its implications by 
examining the diffusion of local loop unbundling (LLU) regulations in the telecommunications sector. We 
find support for the ideas (1) that once institutional factors are taken into account, one should expect 
some convergence in public utility regulation but with still a significant degree of local experimentation, 
and (2) this process will lead to very different results regarding the impact of regulation.    
 
JEL: L5; K2; F42 
 
* The authors are grateful for the comments of A. Chambouleyron, W. Cont and the participants at the 18th 
European Regional ITS (International Telecommunications Society) Conference (Istanbul, Turkey, 2007), and the 
EPFL Brown bag seminar on Network Industries. The authors thank France Telecom for granting this research 
project. 
THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF INTERNATIONAL REGULATORY 
CONVERGENCE IN PUBLIC UTILITIES  
2 
 
Introduction 
Over the last twenty-five years, globalisation has accompanied –and has probably been fostered– 
by what many see as a strong convergence in regulatory policies, especially regarding the reform 
of public utility sectors,1 such as telecommunications, electricity and water (Eising, 2002; 
Genoud and Finger, 2002; Henisz et al., 2005).2 Convergence across countries in the way these 
sectors –and many others– are organized is widely believed to be the result of several factors, 
such as competition, learning and capital mobility (Bennett, 1991; Berger and Dore, 1996). Over 
time, and after specific historical legacies disappear, common economic and public policy 
structures emerge, generating regulatory convergence.  
Critical in this view is the idea that some best practices regarding the way public utilities should 
be regulated tend to emerge through the experiences of certain countries, and these best practices 
are then imitated by others (Gertler, 2001). Regulatory convergence occurs as a consequence of 
this virtuous process, not only regarding the regulations that are adopted but also regarding 
common results of these regulations: ‘imitators’ are assumed to catch up with ‘leaders’, i.e., the 
countries that have been the first to develop and implement the best practices.  
In the context of telecommunications, which we will use here to illustrate our broader theoretical 
approach, policies that have been considered as best practices were, in the beginning, general 
guidelines, such as privatisation of state-owned enterprises, creation of independent regulatory 
bodies and competitive entry into long-distance, local and international call markets. More 
specific ideas have emerged recently in an attempt to fully benefit from the possibilities 
generated by advances in information technologies. In the telecommunication sector, local loop 
unbundling (LLU) is an example of these new policies, developed not only to fuel competition 
but also, in the longer run, to facilitate and accelerate the development of broadband internet 
access to a large portion of countries’ population.  
As illustrated by Figure 1 below, LLU is an example of a regulatory policy that has diffused 
progressively through countries, in a process similar to an ‘S curve’, which often characterises 
the diffusion of successful technologies (Rogers, 1962). Following the United States’ leadership 
(in 1996, the United States became the first country to adopt the LLU decision), countries have, 
                                                 
1
 Public utilities are a key part of the reform package that is now often referred to as the “Washington Consensus”. 
2
 A very large literature has focused on many other sectors and policies, including the financial sector (Frieden, 
1991), environmental policies (Schofer and Hironaka, 2005), corporate governance (Kester, 1996; Khannah et al., 
2006), social security systems (Collier and Messick, 1975), the retail industry (Upham, 1996), antitrust policies 
(Dumez and Jeunemaitre, 1996) and national innovation systems (Holzinger and Knill, 2005; Lundvall and 
Tomlinson, 2000). These studies display a large variation in terms of how much convergence actually occurs across 
these sectors 
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step by step, followed; and the idea that LLU is a necessary condition for regulatory success is 
now well-established everywhere. Even in countries that have not yet implemented LLU (for 
instance, in most countries of Asia and Latin America), this regulatory policy is being considered 
and discussed among politicians, regulators, incumbents and new entrants. 
 
 
However, the idea that LLU is an example of a best practice that has diffused through imitation 
and that has generated relatively uniform types of performance is not supported by further 
investigation.  
First, in many countries, LLU has been discussed as a potential regulation but has been later 
dismissed. Such was the case in Chile, Switzerland and New Zealand, where LLU has been 
rejected or at least postponed (Paltridge, 2001). Similarly, even in countries where LLU 
regulation has been adopted, its application is carried out in many different ways. Umino (2004) 
provides a detailed discussion of the various forms of LLU that have appeared in different 
countries, including full LLU, line sharing, bitstream access or sub-loop unbundling, and the 
various collocation options that have also emerged (e.g., caged collocation, co-mingling, remote 
collocation and virtual collocation).  
Figure 1: The international development of LLU regulation 
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The regulatory obligations imposed on incumbents in the context of LLU also vary significantly 
across countries: in the United Kingdom, for example, the incumbent needs to fulfil clear service 
commitments vis-à-vis new entrants or pay fines if these commitments are not met; in Germany 
and Austria, on the other hand, unbundling decisions are considered only when new entrants 
request LLU; finally, in Australia, a process of self-regulation by the industry itself is being 
introduced. These observations suggest that if some convergence has appeared, it nevertheless 
remains quite far from pure imitation and involves a significant amount of experimentation or 
exploration by most countries.  
This heterogeneity in the adoption of LLU is true also for the result/output of this type of 
regulation. As illustrated by Figure 2, the level of broadband diffusion has sharply increased 
during the last few years, but it remains varied even among OECD countries; other measures of 
the results of LLU (speed of access, for example) reveal similar heterogeneity. Finally, empirical 
studies that have tried to identify and isolate the impact of LLU on broadband development have 
been inconclusive at best (Hausman and Sidak, 2005; Wallsten, 2006).  
 
Figure 2 - Broadband penetration in selected countries
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These observations are not specific to LLU but apply to many other regulatory policies 
implemented to reform public utilities, in which heterogeneity tends to persist in forms and 
results (Dimitrova and Steunenberg, 2000; Lundvall and Tomlinson, 2000; Lutz, 2004; 
Nicolaides, 2004; Radice, 2000; Upham, 1996). 
This paper sets out to explain some aspects of this remaining heterogeneity and, more precisely, 
addresses the following two questions:  
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1. What explains this partial regulatory convergence, which includes both a dose of imitation 
and a fair amount of remaining heterogeneity among countries? 
2. Why do some regulatory policies generate strong positive results in certain countries, but 
fail to do so in other countries? 
As explained earlier, the canonical model of regulatory convergence is based purely on the 
imitation and international diffusion of best practices. However, two important aspects related to 
the political economy of regulatory change are missing in this model.  
The first is interest group competition (Baron, 2001; Bonardi et al., 2006). Public utilities where 
competitive entry is feasible are characterised by heavy lobbying activities both by incumbents 
(including their employees, who benefit from rents if the regulatory status quo is maintained) and 
by new entrants (especially multinational groups trying to benefit from the assets and experience 
accumulated elsewhere, which tend to push regulation towards the imitation of practices that 
have been successful in other countries) (Bonardi, 2004; Campbell, 1994; Cawson et al., 1990; 
Teske, 1991; Vietor, 1994).3 When these (often) opposed influences on policy-making are taken 
into account, regulations tend to display features that are neither full imitations of best practices 
nor full rejection of them, but experiment by combining some elements of each. Experimentation 
with different forms of regulation can therefore emerge as a form of compromise between the 
preferred points of various interests that are parts of the policy-making process. Instead of 
considering discrete outcomes, such as pure ‘local path’ or pure “imitation’, we will consider the 
policies as a continuum as illustrated by Figure 3. 
 
Figure 3: The policy continuum 
 
                                                 
3
 The important political role that multinational firms can play in the process of regulatory convergence has already 
been highlighted in previous work. For example, in the context of the pharmaceutical industry, Ramamurti (2006) 
stresses the political strategy developed by one multinational, Pfizer, which played a decisive role in pushing towards 
regulatory convergence.  
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The second political economy feature that we add to our study is the importance of ‘institutional 
fit’. As argued by North (1990) and proponents of the New Institutional Economics (NIE), 
policies developed successfully in certain countries might be failures in other countries because 
those policies don’t fit with other countries’ underlying institutional conditions. A country’s 
institutional conditions and specific arrangements determine key aspects of how individuals 
behave with respect to each other (degree of opportunism and self-interest, for example), and 
therefore significantly affect transaction costs and the expected outcomes of regulatory policies 
(Levy and Spiller, 1994). As argued by Mukand and Rodrik (2005), if a country imitates a policy 
that has been successfully implemented in a very institutionally distant country, this same 
practice is unlikely to improve the local situations. Regulatory imitation and convergence might 
not improve welfare, which should be taken into account in the regulatory authority’s decision. In 
our model, the regulatory authority will thus be influenced not only by the lobbying of 
incumbents and by new entrants but also by social welfare, i.e., through the reluctance to select a 
policy that is far from the country’s underlying institutional conditions.  
In what follows, we develop a simple theoretical model to capture these dimensions, derive some 
empirical predictions from the model and return to the case of local loop unbundling to illustrate 
and discuss these predictions.  
 
Regulatory decisions, lobbying and institutional fit: a model 
In our model, two interests (multinational interests or new entrants on one side; and local 
interests, such as incumbent operators on the other side) attempt to influence a single decision-
maker, the authority in charge of regulating the utility sector in a given country. These two 
interests behave as principals that seek to contract with the regulatory authority for the policy; the 
regulatory authority is thus a common agent of the two interests, as in Baron (2001), Bernheim 
and Whinston (1986) and Grossman and Helpman (1994). 
Competing interest groups 
The regulatory authority has to choose a policy ℜ∈x . Two types of interest groups try to 
influence the regulatory authority’s decision: multinational actors, m, and local actors, l. 
Multinational actors have a preference for pushing the policy decision towards the imitation of 
policies developed in other parts of the world where these firms have been successful, whereas 
local actors have a preference for keeping a regulatory status quo (the local path) from which 
they can obtain higher rents.4 For both types of actors, policy preferences are represented by a 
                                                 
4
 Certainly, multinationals might prefer different policies in various countries depending on their status in each place 
(as entrants or incumbents). Therefore, our description of multinationals here only focuses on their demand for 
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quadratic utility (loss) function ,)()( 2iii zxxu −−= α with αi > 0 and i = m, l. These actors have 
respective ideal points 0>mz  and 0<lz , and seek to move the policy in their preferred 
direction. 
The two groups therefore compete in the political marketplace to influence the policy decision. 
This competition may take several forms, such as providing resources to the authority that are 
politically valuable in terms of credibility, information or financial resources. We voluntarily 
adopt a loose and large definition of what constitutes supports to the regulatory authority.  
For instance, multinationals pushing for a standardisation of the regulatory procedures in public 
utility sectors can provide very valuable resources, such as helping to acquire financial support 
from the World Bank or the IMF (International Monetary Fund), which has been a key factor of 
public utility reforms in Latin American and many other countries in the 1980s to 1990s (Henisz 
et al., 2005). On the other hand, local interests and incumbents can provide the opposite support 
(in favour of the status quo) by leveraging local public opinion against the imitation of regulatory 
procedures developed elsewhere.  
Similarly, prospective entrants are often favoured with policies that open formerly exclusive 
sectors granted to past service providers, either public or private, shaping the position and rent-
seeking activities of different player in various countries. Notice also that entrants could have a 
much more relevant role in those industries that technically are more suited to the development of 
competition, in particular the telecom sector, and to a lesser degree the energy sector (i.e., the 
generation of electricity and production of natural gas) and international transportation. 
Formally, their support is given by the schedules )(xsi , i = m, l, with policy x chosen by the 
regulatory authority. We further assume that these support functions are linear, in the following 
way:  ).()( lm zxmxs −= ,  and ).()( xzlxs ml −= . That is, the multinational pays m per unit of 
deviation from its less desired policy (zl) and the local interest pays l per unit of deviation from 
zm. 
The regulatory authority 
Similar to Mukand and Rodrik (2005), we start with a sector with the underlying state of the 
world z, in which a regulatory authority implements a policy x, therefore reaching a performance 
given by  
2)()( zxxp j −−= θ  
                                                                                                                                                              
regulations facilitating entry in those countries where they are not the incumbent players. More generally, new 
entrants might not even be multinational firms. 
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We assume that [ ]lm zzz ,∈ , i.e., that the country’s underlying institutional conditions call for a 
policy that is between the preferred points of the competing interest groups.  
With such a definition of the regulator’s preferences, the closer or the more appropriate the policy 
to the underlying state of the world, the higher the performance of the sector. For the generality 
of the model, we do not specify the nature of this performance, which could include several 
factors, such as the level of investment in the network, the network coverage of the country, the 
quality of the service provided to the customers or the (lowest) overall cost of services provided. 
Also, while we refer to the state of nature z as known (common knowledge), the fact is that 
players (including the regulator) have only an unbiased estimation of it.5 
This performance of the sector is assumed to be a component of the regulatory authority’s 
objective function, alongside the two interests’ support schedules. In other words, the regulatory 
authority will balance the support it can acquire from the interests (i.e., its own private interest) 
with some willingness for the public utility sector to achieve its best possible performance (i.e., 
the public interest). We believe that this combination of private and public objectives provides a 
general and relatively accurate depiction of the tensions facing many regulatory agencies and 
bureaucracies (for a discussion, see Mueller, 2003). 
The regulatory authority’s preferred policy (absent any pressures) is thus assumed to be the 
policy that maximises the performance of the sector )(xp j , i.e., the policy that reduces the 
distance between the policy chosen x and the state of the world z. Once those pressures or 
supports are taken into account, the regulatory authority is assumed to have a differentiable, 
quasi-linear utility function given by 
)()()()( xsxsxpxU lmjR ++= . 
Sequence of play 
The interests are assumed to choose their support schedules simultaneously, anticipating the 
optimal reaction of the regulator to them. The game sequence is thus that the interests 
simultaneously offer support schedules and then the regulatory authority chooses the policy x.  
General analysis of the game  
The common agency equilibrium )),(),(( *** xxsxs lm  is defined as  
                                                 
5
 This incomplete information assumption is needed to avoid the fact that, if z was perfectly known (common 
knowledge), then the regulator could be penalized for implementing x* different than z (as this would demonstrate a 
bad policy choice, motivated by the support –transfers– received from any or both interest groups). Yet, to simplify 
the exposition, we leave it aside in what follows. 
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∈*x  maxarg x )()()( ** xsxsxp lmj ++    
with 
(.)))(.),((](.))(.),([maxarg)( **2**(.)* lmmmlmmsm ssxszssxxs m −−−∈ α  
and 
(.)))(.),*((](.))(.),*([maxarg)( *2*(.)* lmlllmlsl ssxszssxxs l −−−∈ α  
As pointed out before, we assume that the two principals decide on their support schedules first 
and then the agent reacts to them. Nevertheless, when the principals make their choice, each of 
them incorporates the regulator’s reaction function, as determined by the first-order condition of 
its optimisation problem. Because each principal makes a punctual prediction of the support 
schedule offered by the other principal, but both recognise that the agent will optimally react to 
their aggregated support schedules, an equilibrium requires that those predictions are correct.  
Providing some second-order conditions hold, an interior solution for the two support schedules 
falls short of a coordinated solution in which the two principals agree on the overall incentive to 
be provided to the agent. 
Equilibrium 
Thus, assuming that the support schedules are differentiable, the solution is the following. 
First, from R’s problem, the first-order condition yields zlmx +−=
θ2
)(
* . 
Second, taking into account this reaction into their own problems (i.e., replacing x* into their 
optimisation problems), both principals decide on their support schedules (the values of m and l 
given our assumptions), according to the following two first order conditions: 
[ ] ][ 02/2/)(2/)()/(: =−−+−−−+−− θθθθα mzzlmzzlmm lmm  
[ ] ][ .02/2/)(2/)()/(: =−−+−+−+− θθθθα lzzlmzzlml mll  
Solving these two equations to find the values of the incentives (marginal supports) m* and l* 
simultaneously offered to the regulator by the two interest groups, we obtain equations that are 
rather messy. However, the following expression, providing the difference of marginal supports 
by the two interests, is quite illustrative (and what is needed to solve x* as a function of 
exogenous parameters): 
[ ]
)3(
)2()()(2
**
θαα
θααθ
++
−++−+−
=−
ml
lmmmll zzzzzzzlm . 
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Indeed, replacing this into the regulator’s choice function, we have: 
[ ]
z
zzzzzzz
x
ml
lmmmll
+++
−++−+−
= )3(
)2()()(
*
θαα
θαα
. 
From the first equation, it is easy to see that if the true state of nature (as expected by everyone) is 
half-way between the two extreme policies supported by the interest groups (i.e., if z=(zl+zm)/2), 
and if the two interests have the same intensity of preferences or capacity to influence the 
regulatory policy (i.e., if αl=αm), then l*=m*, leading to x*=z. Indeed, in the symmetric case 
where the two interests have equally intensive preferences and are also equally distant from the 
(expected) state of nature z regarding their preferred policies, the (marginal) supports offered are 
the same, and the policy chosen by R turns out to be the one that maximizes performance p(x). 
While other results (out of the symmetric case) are ambiguous, it is easy to verify that, when 
z=(zl+zm)/2, m* > l* if αm > αl (that is, the most interested principal offers the highest support). 
More generally, x* increases with z, decreases with αm and increases with αl. Also, x* moves 
closer to z when θ increases (i.e., when the performance is more affected by the policy chosen). 
Also, since the two principals cannot coordinate the level of their support schedules (so that they 
could minimize sm(.)+sl(.) for a given net support s’m(.) + s’l(.), or m*–l*), part of their utilities 
are captured as rents by the agent. 
To make it easier to explore both the properties of this equilibrium and its relevance to our 
analysis of convergence, consider a more specific numerical example with parameters taking the 
following values: 1=== θαα lm , ,0=z  41−=lz , and 41−=lz . 
In that case, the equilibrium is 101
*
=x . Also, if αm increases to 2 (all else remaining the same), 
then 61
*
=x  (a higher value, as the multinational became more interested in supporting a policy 
closer to its preferred point). 
One can see from this solution that none of the interest achieves exactly what it wants. But 
because the interests know that they would be worse off if they didn’t lobby, they each lobby to 
be a counterpoint to the other. As seen before, though, this does not mean that the regulatory 
policy adopted affects the two interests equally. In fact, the multinationals / new entrants find 
themselves advantaged by the regulatory outcome: they have more extreme preferences (when 
one considers their respective ideal points, lm zz > ), are ready to spend more to pull the policy 
towards their preferred point (we do not calculate how much each interest spends here, but this 
can be easily done and would support this point), and therefore end up with an equilibrium for the 
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game to their advantage, i.e. towards some forms of imitation and regulatory convergence that are 
closer to the policies they advocated for than to those claimed by the incumbents.  
On the other hand, if the situation were reversed and lm zz < , then the equilibrium would tend 
to a more local solution as favoured by the incumbents / local interests.  
A first general prediction emerging from this analysis is that imitation and regulatory 
convergence tend to become stronger in cases where (1) multinationals and/or new entrants have 
a stronger preference and allocate more efforts towards pulling the policy in their favour, and in 
cases where (2) incumbents and/or local interests have relatively less extreme preferences 
(Prediction 1). 
Also, when the underlying institutional environment allows the enforcement of policies favouring 
competition and entry (i.e., z is closer to zm), then the expected policy choice is closer to imitation 
(Prediction 2).  
A more general prediction for the study of regulatory convergence is that, as soon as the policy-
making process portrays both incumbents and new entrants / multinationals, the policy outcome 
will be characterised by some form of experimentation (rather than a pure local solution or pure 
imitation). Regarding policy diffusion, one should observe direct imitation of regulations 
developed elsewhere (i.e., ‘off the shelf’) only in some very rare occasions. In most cases, even if 
multinational firms are influential, local aspects will be included and some local experimentation 
will follow (Prediction 3).  
Another aspect of the equilibrium solution that we haven’t discussed so far relates to the weight 
of the different actors in the policy-making process (αm and αl). Irrespective of the interests’ 
preferred positions, these weightings will have a key impact in the game.6 They can also change 
over time if, for example, public opinion turns widely against the imitation of best practices 
developed elsewhere. In that case, the convergence process might even be stopped or reversed. 
Thus, a breach in the convergence process would be characterised by a situation in which strong 
new entrants pushed towards imitation in an early period, whereas stronger local interests 
(potentially driven by a change in public opinion) regain influence and pull policy more towards 
a local solution (Prediction 4). 
Our equilibrium solution has also important implications for policy performance in the sector, as 
discussed below.  
                                                 
6
 As an illustration, if αm increases from 1 to 2 (and the rest of the variables remain with the same values as 
previously illustrated in the text), x* increases from 1/12 to 1/4 (much closer to 1/2 -zm-, the favorite policy for 
multinationals and new entrants). 
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The question of the performance of regulatory reforms 
Our model has predictions for the equilibrium policy to be observed in each country, and this 
equilibrium provokes different performances according to the underlying state of nature (z) 
characterising each country. Thus, we can think of ‘institutional distance’ as the differences in z 
across countries, a variable that affects the regulatory policies adopted (leading to convergence or 
not) but also –more directly– the performance derived from a given policy in various countries. 
Figure 4 summarises the implications of our framework on the question of regulatory reforms. 
Remember that policy choices here are viewed as a continuum between the pure imitation of 
foreign policies (as favoured by entrants and multinational actors) and a pure local solution close 
to the status quo (favoured by incumbents and local rent-seekers). The other important dimension 
is the institutional distance between the country profiled and the countries that have developed 
the most successful regulatory policies (i.e., the best practices that multinational actors would like 
to see implemented everywhere). 
When institutional distance is narrow, the best performance will come from countries that have 
imitated their leading peers, i.e., from countries in which entrants and multinational actors have 
been strong enough relative to incumbents and local actors to pull regulatory policies towards the 
imitation of best practices (as in Prediction 1 or for countries with an institutional environment 
naturally leading to entry and competition (as in Prediction 2).  
When institutional distance increases, imitation becomes less and less efficient because the ‘off-
the-shelf” policies’ fit with the local institutional environment tends to worsen. Therefore, for 
countries that are “far from leaders” (institutionally), the most successful policies should be those 
that involve a higher level of experimentation and the discovery of specific institutional 
arrangements and regulatory policies with a better fit to the underlying local formal and informal 
institutions. 
As per our model of the previous section, such policies take place in countries with a greater 
balance between multinational actors and local interests. Each type of interest tends to pull policy 
in its preferred direction, and the regulatory authority is better off selecting the in-between option 
that involves a significant amount of experimentation. 
In our model, experimentation also takes place when it should take place (indeed, if z is precisely 
halfway between zm and zl, and at the same time αm = αl, then x*=z). Thus, we could have 
experimentation indicating very different things: middle-of-the-way reforms that are inconsistent 
and respond only to the pressure of interested principals (performance in those will be poor), and 
reforms that strike a good balance between instrumental best-practice and domestic institutions 
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(producing some kind of convergence at the ‘principles level,’ i.e., regardless of instrumental or 
superficial second-order details). 
As the policy choice moves towards local rent-seeking and status quo (and real experimentation 
tends to disappear), financial resources tend to be siphoned by incumbents and local interests, 
leading to poor performance. This is the case when local interests dominate the political game 
with little lobbying counter-actions by new entrants and international actors. 
Figure 4: Institutional distance, policy choices and expected 
performance of regulatory reforms 
 
To summarise, this discussion provides the following additional predictions: 
Prediction 5: For countries that are far from the leaders, those that will be the most successful 
with their reforms are characterised by a good mix of competition between international interests 
and local interests (experimenting with policies that combine imitation and local aspects is more 
likely to result in achieving regulations that fit with the underlying institutional environment). 
Note that, among these countries, some will fail. However, we expect the successful countries to 
be those that experiment.  
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Prediction 6: For countries that are institutionally close to a leader (who supposedly chose a 
policy fitting its institutional environment), a small dose of local interest and powerful 
international interests will lead to more favourable outcomes, because these interests will 
generate a high level of imitation of existing policies that have proven to be efficient. 
Prediction 7: Countries that are expected to perform poorly are countries with strong powerful 
international interests and/or new entrants but institutionally far from the leader, AND countries 
with powerful local interests and/or incumbents that could derive high benefits from imitation. 
 
The case of local loop unbundling (LLU) 
Local loop unbundling is selected for studying our predictions empirically because it has been 
widely presented as the best practice that regulators around the world follow to promote 
competition in telecommunication services. The underlying theory is that LLU makes the 
subscriber line available to competitors, and therefore enables the development of 
complementary network devices and services among a large number of competing firms (for 
instance, fast internet access and IP [internet protocol] telephony). Increased competition should 
then lead to lower access prices, better networks and higher broadband penetration. On the other 
hand, according to the common view, without LLU, these desired effects will not materialise. 
In spite of these differing views, as argued earlier, clear variations exist regarding whether LLU 
has been adopted and how it has been implemented. Similarly, in terms of performance, LLU 
regulation is perceived as a success in some countries and a failure in many others, whereas some 
countries (Switzerland and New Zealand, for example) are argued to be satisfied because they 
haven’t implemented it. The purpose of this section is to show that some of these observations 
can be explained by our model.  
For clarity of exposition, LLU needs to be differentiated from interconnection.7 With LLU, the 
new entrant connects its equipment between the user and the local switch, providing the entrant 
with direct access to the user. With interconnection, on the other hand, the entrant is connected at 
a place beyond the local switch and effectively buys its access to the user from the incumbent. 
Interconnection thus provides a strong competitive advantage to the incumbent, who can use it to 
drive up the entrant’s costs (especially in a system in which only the incumbent knows the real 
costs of the lines, making it difficult to regulate this cost externally). For this reason, LLU has 
been often considered a best-practice regulation, which should be implemented by most countries 
around the world, especially to promote the development of internet usage.  
                                                 
7
 For a schematic representation of the difference between interconnection and LLU, see for instance Wallsten 
(2006). 
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Local loop unbundling and institutional fit: why LLU might not work everywhere 
In this section, we explain why LLU is expected to work well in certain countries (with certain 
institutional conditions) and not as well in others (especially countries that are institutionally far 
from these leaders).  
Because our underlying assumption regarding the role of institutions is based on insights from the 
New Institutional Economics (NIE), it is natural to build on NIE’s core concepts, especially 
transaction costs related to situations in which contracting is made difficult by attributes such as 
uncertainty, opportunism and asset specificity (Williamson, 1985). Under certain institutional 
conditions, LLU might create infrastructure investment disincentives and potential inefficient 
safeguards against transaction hazards (for a discussion, see Spiller and Ulset, 2003). Transaction 
cost problems, in the context of LLU, emerge because incumbents and new entrants face different 
sets of incentives, which can make trade and contracts between them difficult to achieve. In 
theory, LLU provides benefits both for incumbents and new entrants. Incumbents receive 
increased local traffic, and new entrants can provide complementary facilities and services. Very 
often, however, incumbents are worried that unbundled prices (determined by a regulatory 
authority) will drive profits from the increased local traffic. Two problems appear. 
The first problem is related to new entrants trying to snatch subscribers from incumbents, in an 
industry that requires some cooperation to ensure that communications flow seamlessly through 
the network. 
Another key problem is related to the potential costs for the new entrants, knowing that these 
costs will generally have to be set by the regulator. In cases in which the incumbents are strong 
enough to efficiently lobby for higher costs, investment incentives for new entrants disappear. In 
certain countries, these transaction problems might be very high, whereas in others they might be 
much lower because institutional rules and mechanisms will constrain the ability of incumbent to 
strongly influence or even bypass the regulator’s decisions. Imitation of LLU regulation might 
therefore succeed in certain countries and fail in others depending on the underlying institutional 
environment.8 
                                                 
8
 The previous discussion bypasses the fact that LLU implementation could fail not just due to institutional 
weaknesses but also because another regulatory decision was inconsistent with the promotion of new entry in the 
first place (e.g., minimum investment requirements and coverage obligations that are too demanding). Thus, besides 
institutional quality, the ‘consistency’ of various instrumental elements of design is key for a good performance 
emerging from reforms (including LLU). Under good institutional environments, one should expect a higher 
probability of consistency of instrumental policies, suggesting that such governance quality might be a better 
explanatory variable than instrumental choices, such as LLU. In any case, we don’t advance on this issue here and 
leave this question open for further research. 
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Exploring our predictions: how to measure countries’ regulatory convergence in the context of 
LLU? 
To explore our predictions, we first need a measure about the degree to which countries have 
converged regarding LLU. This is not an easy task because, as suggested earlier, countries have 
implemented different kinds of unbundling, making comparisons across countries difficult. To 
overcome this barrier, we consider a relatively simple but general data: the ratio of unbundled 
lines, i.e., the number of unbundled lines divided by total lines in the country.  
Because we wish to capture convergence, we consider as our key measure the difference between 
the ratio of unbundled lines in each country and the ratio of unbundled lines for the leader, i.e., 
the United States. The lower this figure, the stronger the country’s move towards imitation and 
regulatory convergence. Conversely, the higher this figure, the more the country remains close to 
a local path. Countries with ratios between these extremes incorporate some aspects of both and 
are therefore in the experimentation / discovery mode.  
Figure 5 summarises these data for 32 countries in 2003. 
  
Figure 5: Regulatory convergence regarding LLU
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We can now use this measure to explore our predictions.  
Interest group competition and LLU adoption: some primary evidence  
In order to test whether insights from our model match with LLU, we need to consider two 
factors: (1) whether the preference / influence of incumbents matters (the assumption is that the 
incumbents promote a purely local path), and (2) whether the preference / influence of new 
entrants matters. To capture these two dimensions, we consider the following measure: the 
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market share of incumbents in the wireless phone market (an indicator of the strength of 
incumbents in protecting their domestic market).9 Throughout this section, the data collected 
corresponds to year 2003 (which allows us to evaluate the posterior evolution of broadband 
penetration until 2005, based on the situation observed at that time).10 
To explore our first two predictions, we plot this measure together with our measure of 
convergence (distance from the leader regarding LLU). Figure 6 weakly supports the influence of 
incumbents. The general trend is upward-sloping: the lowest level of LLU imitation tends to be 
found in countries where incumbents have been able to keep the highest market shares in the 
mobile segment (the correlation coefficient, though, is only 0.19).11 
  
Another preliminary evaluation of our prediction 2 would be to test whether LLU adoption (as in 
Figure 6) is correlated with institutional quality (as reflected in the governance indicators 
developed by the World Bank, 2006).12 Figure 7 presents the plot, indicating that such a 
relationship exists: countries with better governance indicators tend to adopt LLU (and this time 
the correlation coefficient is more significant, i.e., –0.45, and one can easily observe that the 
negative correlation would be much higher by limiting the sample to countries that significantly 
differed from the leader regarding LLU in 2003). 
                                                 
9
 Measuring the market share of incumbents in the wireless phone market is just one of various possible indicators. 
Another indicator could be the market share of incumbents in the long-distance market (in particular, both of them 
are independent of LLU, avoiding causality circles). Furthermore, after a major change in the identity of players 
occurs (through privatization, for example), computing these indicators might be tricky, and the strength of local 
interests might also be better represented in other ways. 
10
 Focusing on 2003 data and limiting the posterior evolution to 2005 also minimise the effects of broadband 
penetration through cable or wireless, particularly acute in the last few years (a development that has increasingly 
called into doubt whether LLU is convenient or necessary in various places where it was thought to be desirable 
before). 
11
 A significant observation explaining this low correlation coefficient is Colombia (without this country, the 
correlation coefficient would be around 0.42 instead of 0.19). In Colombia, despite the reduced participation of 
incumbent operators in the mobile market, local interests have been very strong so far (in particular, they have 
managed to reserve the long-distance service to three –then local– operators). Thus, alternative measures to capture 
the strength of incumbent operators and local interests might modify the empirical support to our Prediction 1. 
12
 The World Bank has constructed a set of six governance indicators: voice and accountability, political stability, 
government effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of law and control of corruption. Because regulatory quality might 
be representing instrumental choices (such as LLU), we construct an aggregate governance indicator that leaves this 
variable outside (the values for each country, however, do not change significantly). Each of the six indicators 
constructed by the World Bank combines various primary sources (polls and surveys), providing some robustness to 
these figures that other primary studies lack. In any case, as usual, such ‘soft’ and subjective indicators should be 
interpreted with caution (as should other apparently ‘harder’ data). 
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Figure 6: LLU regulations as driven by the incumbent's influence on the 
regulatory game
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Considering these two determinants for LLU adoption, the simple linear OLS equation shown 
below –controlling for gross domestic product (GDP) per capita – reflects that LLU adoption as 
of 2003 (i.e., a smaller difference with the leader regarding LLU) is positively affected by 
aggregate governance and (not significantly) affected negatively by the relative importance of the 
incumbent in the local lobbying game (as approximated by its market share on wireless 
telephony): 
 DLLU  =        0.07  +  0.3 Imsh – 0.01 GOV – 0.00 GDPpc 
(std. error)     (0.02)   (0.2)           (0.005)            (0.00)       
(t-statistic)     (3.9)    (1.3)               (1.8)*           (–0.3)       
(adjusted) R2: 0.21, * (significant at 90%), 
where DLLU denotes the difference of LLU with respect of the leader (the United States), Imsh 
denotes the incumbent’s market share in the wireless telephony market, GOV reflects the 
aggregate governance indicator (average 1996 to 2003) and GDPpc denotes per capita GDP (in 
U.S. dollars, 2003). The low fit of the equation (21%) clearly indicates, though, that many more 
determinants for LLU adoption (including those modelled before that could not be controlled 
here) need to be identified. 
Another related and interesting question is why certain countries have decided to avoid LLU. 
Below we briefly look at the case study of Colombia (which bears some similarities with other 
Latin American countries) to explore whether our model retains explanatory power to explain this 
type of situation. 
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Figure 7: Local Loop Unbundling and Aggregate Governance, 2003
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Why not move towards convergence? The example of Colombia  
As with most other countries in Latin America, Colombia has chosen not to unbundle the local 
loop. In fact, only a timid incentive has existed to do so, provided since 2005 by article 5.2.5 in 
CRT (Telecommunication Regulatory Commission) Resolution 1250, by which those local 
operators that can prove to have sufficiently disaggregated their local loop or have received 
sufficient resale in their service areas, are able to ask the regulator to gain tariff flexibility vis-à-
vis their final users, but such flexibility is not guaranteed (nor has it been petitioned or granted so 
far).13 Currently, though, and due to the adaptations in its regulatory policy according to the Free 
Trade Agreement (FTA, or TLC by its Spanish acronyms) that is being negotiated with the 
United States, LLU is one of the reforms being discussed. Other reforms being considered 
include liberalisation of long-distance services – to be licensed under a common permit with 
other services, whereas now only three operators are allowed to compete – and mandatory 
wholesale broadband access imposed on dominant firms. 
As predicted by our model, this ‘local-path’ followed in Colombia is at least partly related to the 
strength of incumbents: historically, the largest operator has been Telecom, privatised to 
Telefónica of Spain  in 2006, but other public regional operators, such as the municipalities of 
Medellín and Bogotá, have also been influential in the domestic political process. The influence 
                                                 
13
 Before this mild attempt, Resolution 087 in 1997 also stated that ‘A dominant operator might be obliged to offer 
disaggregated network or service elements as chosen by the CRT, receiving a compensation from the requesting 
operator. The CRT will carry on a study about the services requiring network elements. If it finds it necessary, the 
CRT will ask the operators requesting LLU to present a study determining a) whether there is a potential market for 
the services to be offered, and b) whether the local incumbent operator is capable of providing those services at 
reasonable prices’. This resolution imposes a myriad of bureaucratic complications that have rendered this formal 
provision ineffective. 
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of these incumbents – who have absorbed other minor pre-existing players – has also been 
strengthened by workers’ unions shutting down telecom services in the early 1990s. On the other 
hand, the influence of international entrants, even major firms, such as Telefónica and Telmex 
(replacing unsuccessful initial North American investors), has remained, until recently, relatively 
small in comparison. As suggested in our model, a reform involving a significant level of LLU 
had little chance to take place in this context.  
As argued by Prediction 2 in our model, the institutional environment was also not clearly 
conducive to entry and competition, making it less likely to push towards convergence regarding 
LLU. The institutional capabilities of administrating the conflicts naturally emerging between 
firms regarding LLU requirements have been quite limited so far: the regulatory agency (the 
Telecommunication Regulatory Commission, CRT) does not have control powers and has very 
minor sanctioning functions (reserved mostly for the Superintendence of Domestic Public 
Services, SSPD). The CRT’s decisions – and those of other sector regulators in Colombia – are 
constantly challenged in the judicial system. The antitrust functions, resting within the SSPD, are 
also not enforced properly, given the multiple functions under its responsibility. This situation 
has created a significant distance between regulatory convergence regarding LLU (zm in our 
model) and the underlying institutional environment in the country (z). 
Institutional distance and performance: some country studies 
First, we can explore whether the ‘traditional’ explanation for regulatory convergence –according 
to which regulatory convergence flows naturally from best practices being learnt and exported 
everywhere– is supported by the data. If the data support the traditional view, then our model 
would be of little empirical relevance, at least in the case of LLU. To get a sense for the nature of 
regulatory convergence, we plot in Figure 8 our measure of convergence (distance with the 
leader) with broadband penetration.  
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Figure 8: Difference from the leader and broadband penetration 
(measure of performance of LLU regulations)
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Although the data show a positive correlation between ‘imitation’ (small distance from the leader 
regarding LLU) and ‘performance’ (broadband penetration), such correspondence is still weak 
(the correlation coefficient is –0.45, computing distance instead of proximity to the leader, as 
shown in Figure 8).  
Also, since LLU unbundling might be related to broadband penetration resulting only from the 
improved use of the public telephone network, an alternative measure of performance might be 
broadband penetration through DSL subscriptions. In that regard, other measures of performance, 
such as the number of DSL subscribers per fixed line or the increase in DSL penetration between 
2003 and 2005, reflect a lower correlation with LLU (–0.33 and –0.31, respectively). Figure 9 
represents this last case. 
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Figure 9: Increased DSL penetration and LLU
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Thus, as suggested by our earlier theoretical discussion, Figures 8 and 9 bear little support for the 
idea that countries that have imitated LLU are the most successful ones. No obvious pattern 
seems to emerge. 
Indeed, controlling for the number of fixed-line telephones and per capita GDP, the performance 
measured by increased DSL penetration between 2003 and 2005 is independent of LLU (in 2003) 
and is only correlated with the aggregate governance indicator for each country at that time. 
These results suggest that the instrumental features or details of regulation are of less importance 
than the overall quality of basic regulatory designs emerging from better general governance 
standards. More specifically, the results obtained from a simple linear regression based on the 31 
observations described in the annex at the end of the paper indicate the following. 
∆ DSL =        – 0.1  +  0.5 DLLU  – 0.03 GOV + 0.00 GDPpc – 0.00 ML 
(std. error)     (0.04)   (0.3)              (0.01)            (0.00)               (0.00) 
(t-statistic)    (–2.8)    (1.6)               (2.7)*            (2.0)**           (–0.01) 
(adjusted) R2: 0.62, * (significant at 99%), ** (significant at 95%), 
where ∆ DSL denotes the increased DSL penetration (as percentage of inhabitants) between 2003 
and 2005, DLLU denotes the difference of LLU with respect of the leader (the United States), 
GOV reflects the aggregate governance indicator (average 1996 to 2003), GDPpc denotes per 
capita GDP (in U.S. dollars, 2003) and ML is the number of main lines per 100 inhabitants in 
2003.14 
                                                 
14
 GDPpc and GOV are highly correlated (0.8), explaining why the former plays no role as an explanatory variable. If 
GDPpc is eliminated from the OLS regression, the overall results hold (improving the significance of governance as 
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Finally, we can see that the data used so far in the paper provides preliminary support to our 
Prediction 7: Figure 10 shows that DSL penetration tends to be lower in those countries having 
strong international / new entrant interests (as measured by the entrants’ market shares in the 
mobile market) where, at the same time, aggregate governance is weaker (as measured by the 
complement of the governance index vis-à-vis its maximum possible value).15 
 
Figure 10: Poor performance with compounded importance of 
entrants and deficient governance
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This primary analysis, based on information for year 2003, is thus consistent with the idea that 
“institutional fit and distance” play important roles in explaining the outcomes associated with 
regulatory convergence in various countries. 
To explore with more qualitative details this question of the regulatory outcomes associated with 
LLU convergence, we now look at a couple of case studies.  
Austria: How an early imitator receives disappointing results because of a lack of institutional 
fit 
Austria was one of the first countries to imitate the LLU experience in North America. Austria 
allowed LLU in August 1997, i.e., in the Telecommunication Act that started the liberalisation 
process for telecoms in this country.  
However, this liberalisation process did not lead to quick advances in the level of competition or 
broadband development because of long discussions between the incumbent, Telekom Austria 
                                                                                                                                                              
the only relevant explanatory variable). Still, we report this crude estimation due to its purely motivational purpose. 
Furthermore, computing increased broadband instead of increased DSL penetration between 2003 and 2005, the 
results remain qualitatively identical (with a little better fit). 
15
 However, this result is derived from the positive correlation between performance and aggregate governance 
pointed out before, as broadband / DSL penetration is fully unrelated to the participation of new entrants in the 
mobile market. 
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(TA) and potential new entrants and a lack of control of the regulatory authority over the process. 
The regulatory authority, newly created, was not prepared for LLU and was not in a position to 
impose LLU to the incumbent, therefore making the LLU ruling relatively ineffective.  
Only in 1999 did the regulator clarify the rules under which firms had to operate regarding LLU. 
Many different agreements needed to be found not only between TA and the new entrants in 
telecom but also between TA and internet service providers (ISPs). This process happened slowly 
in 2000, 2001 and 2002. As predicted by our model, this example suggests that imitating a 
regulation that seems to have been successful in another country that is institutionally distant 
might not lead to positive results.  
Finland: a country that went more for experimentation than imitation of LLU, but with good 
results because of an accommodating institutional structure  
Finland is a clear example of a country that has engaged in unbundling, but through a process and 
with results that are radically different from those of any other OECD country. Finland’s 
experience is as much tainted by experimentation as it is by pure imitation of the LLU as 
implemented in the United States and in other European countries. Much of the reason for this 
difference derives from the historical structure of Finnish telecommunications, which was not a 
monopoly but instead counted several operators, making it more prone to competition. When 
deregulation occurred, competition flowed naturally among these operators. LLU was mandated 
in 1999 and, more interestingly, granted to anybody, not only to the ‘official’ competitors, which 
already had a licence to operate.  
Also, different from most other countries, telecom operators have negotiated agreements among 
themselves without extensive review or involvement by the regulator. Despite complaints from 
some new entrants, the institutional system accommodated these differences and worked quite 
well. Finland has one of the highest relative numbers of unbundled lines and a high broadband 
penetration. This example supports the idea that, in many cases, countries that experience and 
adapt a regulation to the local environment might be more successful than just pure imitation. 
 
Conclusion  
Should we expect to see regulatory convergence for public utilities? And, if some convergence 
does occur, should we expect it to be effective? This paper suggests that, on the one hand, after 
important political economy factors are taken into account, one should expect some convergence, 
but far from total convergence and still with a significant amount of local experimentation; on the 
other hand, this process will lead to dramatically different results regarding regulatory outcomes, 
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depending on the institutional distance between the leading countries and the followers trying to 
mimic them.  
The case of local loop unbundling seems to support these propositions. However, one needs to 
bear in mind some potential limitations of this case. First, LLU is still in its early stages of 
development (even in the United States and in Western Europe, the percentage of unbundled lines 
remains relatively modest; the same can be said for broadband penetration, one potential measure 
for regulatory success). Because of this limited time span, the convergence trajectory and 
regulatory outcomes related to imitation are a little more difficult to evaluate. Second, even in the 
United States (considered in our analysis as the leading country), LLU is still not judged as a total 
success. Again, the future will tell us more. Third, as preliminarily shown in the previous section, 
performance might be related to basic indicators of institutional quality / governance, which are 
the elements necessary for coherent implementation of regulatory reforms that look for more 
rapid and less expensive development of key telecom services and infrastructure.  
The direct implication of these last two comments is that more empirical studies about regulatory 
convergence in public utilities and its outcome are warranted. We leave this for future research.  
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Annex: Data 
  
Broadband per 
inhabitant, 2003 
Broadband per 
inhabitant, 2005 
DSL as per 
inhabitant, 2003 
DSL per 
inhabitant, 2005 
Difference 
from leader 
regarding LLU, 
2003 
Market share 
incumbent in 
wireless telephony, 
2003 
Aggregate 
Governance (0-5 
range), 1996-2003* 
GDP per capita 
(USD), 2003 
Main telephone 
lines (fixed 
lines) per 100 
inhabitants, 2003 
Australia 
                 0,03                   0,10                   0,01                   0,08  0,035                 0,45                   4,14               26.331                   52,6  
Austria 
                 0,07                   0,14                   0,03                   0,08  0,030                 0,38                   4,09               31.208                   47,6  
Belgium 
                 0,12                   0,19                   0,07                   0,12  0,050                 0,45                   3,83               29.677                   46,9  
Canada 
                 0,14                   0,20                   0,06                   0,09  0,010                 0,40                   4,15               27.305                   64,9  
Czech 
                 0,00                   0,05                      -                     0,02  0,065                 0,42                   3,21                 8.955                   35,5  
Denmark 
                 0,13                   0,25                   0,09                   0,15  0,040                 0,46                   4,30               39.616                   67,0  
Finland 
                 0,09                   0,22                   0,08                   0,19  0,030                 0,45                   4,40               31.420                   49,2  
France 
                 0,06                   0,16                   0,05                   0,15  0,050                 0,45                   3,75               29.915                   56,6  
Germany 
                 0,05                   0,13                   0,05                   0,13  0,034                 0,38                   4,03               29.427                   65,7  
Greece 
                 0,00                   0,01                   0,00                   0,01  0,055                 0,40                   3,19               15.254                   55,0  
Hungary 
                 0,03                   0,06                   0,01                   0,04  0,055                 0,48                   3,30                 8.219                   35,6  
Iceland 
                 0,14                   0,27                   0,13                   0,26  0,055                 0,45                   4,32               37.343                   66,6  
Ireland 
                 0,01                   0,08                   0,01                   0,06  0,050                 0,48                   4,01               30.936                   49,1  
Italy 
                 0,04                   0,12                   0,04                   0,11  0,049                 0,40                   3,27               25.919                   45,9  
Japan 
                 0,12                   0,17                   0,09                   0,11  0,020                 0,28                   3,66               33.156                   47,2  
Korea 
                 0,23                   0,25                   0,13                   0,14  0,050                 0,42                   3,04               12.710                   52,5  
Luxembourg 
                 0,03                   0,15                   0,03                   0,14  0,055                 0,52                   4,27               63.723                   54,3  
Mexico 
                 0,00                   0,02                   0,00                   0,01  0,055                 0,55                   2,34                 6.255                   16,0  
Netherlands 
                 0,12                   0,25                   0,06                   0,15  0,047                 0,50                   4,27               32.866                   48,2  
Norway 
                 0,09                   0,21                   0,07                   0,17  0,046                 0,45                   4,27               48.673                   48,9  
NZ 
                 0,02                   0,08                   0,02                   0,07  0,070                 0,47                   4,30               20.435                   45,6  
Poland 
                 0,01                   0,02                   0,01                   0,02  0,055                 0,35                   3,09                 5.610                   31,9  
Portugal 
                 0,05                   0,12                   0,02                   0,07  0,055                 0,48                   3,71               14.751                   40,9  
Slovak 
                 0,00                   0,03                   0,00                   0,02  0,055                 0,70                   2,99                 6.072                   24,1  
Spain 
                 0,05                   0,12                   0,04                   0,09  0,055                 0,47                   3,65               20.596                   41,6  
Sweden 
                 0,09                   0,21                   0,05                   0,13  0,021                 0,53                   4,28               33.586                   72,9  
Switzerland 
                 0,11                   0,22                   0,07                   0,15  0,070                 0,55                   4,41               43.713                   72,3  
Turkey 
                 0,00                   0,02                   0,00                   0,02  0,070                 0,54                   2,18                 3.366                   26,5  
UK 
                 0,06                   0,17                   0,04                   0,12  0,052                 0,25                   4,08                 3.039                   58,1  
Argentina 
                 0,01                   0,02                   0,00                   0,02  0,070                 0,70                   2,40                 3.423                   22,7  
Colombia 
                 0,00                   0,01                   0,00                   0,00  0,070                 0,09                   1,79                 1.814                   17,9  
US 
                 0,10                   0,17                   0,03                   0,07  0,000 n.a.                 3,88               37.691                   62,9  
Source: ITU (2006), OECD and Idate (2006). 
* Based on the linear average of five indicators (voice and accountability; political stability; government effectiveness; rule of law and control of corruption), which represent the 
linear average of five observations between years 1996 and 2003, as constructed by the World Bank. 
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